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The federally funded Human Genome Initiative will lead to the development of new
capabilities to learn about an individual's genetic status. Legal issues are raised concerning
patients' and other parties' access to that information. This article discusses the effect of
existing statutes and case lawon three pivotalquestions: Towhat sortofinformation are people
entitled? What control should people have over their genetic information? Do people have a
right to refuse genetic information? The article emphasizes that the law protects a patient's
right to obtain or refuse genetic information about oneself, as well as the right to control the
dissemination ofthat information to others.
The fruits ofthe Human Genome Initiative-onwhich over abillion dollarswill be
spent in the next 15 years to map and sequence the human genome-will help to
push us from the old genetics to the new genetics [1]. Under the old genetics,
predictions about genetic disease were made based on an individual's family history
or on diagnostic tests which measured gene products, such as proteins. Disorders
weretreated, forthe most part, aftersymptoms appeared. Formanygenetic diseases,
there was no treatment-so couples were faced with the agonizing decision of
whether to abort an affected fetus.
Under the new genetics, direct diagnosis will be made of the genes themselves.
The clinician will gain information about an individual's genetic predispositions to
certain diseases (such as lungcancer) or the fact that the individual will suffer from a
late-onset disorder such as Huntington's disease. New treatment may also be
developed usinggenetic technologies. In September 1990, for example, the National
Institutes of Health approved the first proposal to use gene therapy in humans [2].
The protocol involves gene therapy in children with severe combined immune
deficiency, caused by the lack ofthe enzyme adenosine deaminase (ADA).
The Human Genome Initiative raises notonlymedical challenges but legal ones as
well. In fact, 3 percent of the budget for the Human Genome Initiative will be
devoted to research not on the scientific, but on the ethical ramifications ofmapping
and sequencing the human genome [3].
The key ethical and legal issues that have been identified thus far revolve around
the use ofgenetic information [4]. The first is: To what sort ofgenetic information are
people entitled? For example, are people entitled to the results of a test that has not
yet been perfected and so gives ambiguous results? Should they be told about which
environmental stimuli to avoidwhentheyhave agenetic predisposition to harmfrom
those stimuli? Should they be told of the new significance of previously rendered
genetic tests?
The second issue is: What controlshouldpeople have overtheirgenetic information?
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For example, should people be able to prevent disclosure of their genetic status to
relatives, insurers, employers, or law enforcement officials?
The third issue is: Do people have a right to refuse genetic information about
themselves? Could the government, for example, force adults to acquire genetic
information about themselves through mandatory screening programs?
THE SCOPE OF DISCLOSURE
As genetic technologies grow more sophisticated, the medical community is
increasingly able to discover deleterious genes in individuals, which indicate that
they are carriers of genetic disorders or that they already have or will develop
genetically based diseases or handicaps. Much ofsuch predictive capability has been
in the reproductive field, enabling parents to discover in advance whether theymight
be passing on to their offspring a handicapping or fatal genetic illness. These
developments have led to concomitant legal responsibilities. Health care profession-
als must warn individuals of the genetic risks they and their potential offspring face,
must disclose the availability oftesting to diagnose genetic status, and, ifsuch testing
is requested, must perform it in an acceptable manner [5]. If they do not, they face
the possibility of a wrongful birth case [6] brought by the couple or-in a handful of
states-awrongful life case [7] brought by the child.
But the new diagnostic tests being developed are not as clear-cut as the tests for
Down's syndrome or Tay-Sachs disease that served as the basis for the previous
lawsuits. As a result, questions arise about the scope of disclosure required-for
example, with respect to ambiguous results or genetic predispositions.
The Case ofCystic Fibrosis
The case of cystic fibrosis illustrates the issue of ambiguous results. In August
1989, the gene for cystic fibrosiswas identified [8]. Three months later, the American
Society for Human Genetics called for a voluntary moratorium on widespread
population screening, and a National Institute ofHealth conference quicklyfollowed
suit. There is a concern about the need to establish mechanisms for education and
counseling, and a worry about the manpower resources needed to do so. Since one in
25 Caucasians in the U.S. is a carrier, up to eight million people would be identified
by the test [8], and there are not enough genetically trained health care providers to
meet that new responsibility. Another reason for caution is the fact that the test
identifies only about 70 percent of cystic fibrosis carriers who have not yet had an
affected child. This fact means that "[f]or every couple who could be helped by the
test, there will be about 25 more in limbo, in which just one is a carrier" [8].
Pediatrician Michael Kaback has called forpilot programs "to evaluate, amongother
things, which educational approachesworkbest, how many people elect to be tested,
just what the counseling needs are, and 'how much fearwe create' " [8].
Could a couple who gives birth to a child affected with cystic fibrosis sue the
obstetrician or genetic counselor for not revealing that a cystic fibrosis test is
available? Such a suit might be brought, but it seems unlikely that the couple would
prevail, given the current high likelihood that the couple would receive ambiguous
information. Once the test increases in its predictive value, though, such suits would
be permissible, even given the manpower shortage in the genetics field.
Part of what will determine whether health care providers are held liable for
disclosing or not disclosing the availability of the cystic fibrosis test will be the
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standards that the health care providers themselves set. And it seems that geneticists
tend to put a high value on disclosure. Dorothy Wertz and John Fletcher surveyed
677 geneticists in 12 countries (including the United States) [9]. In response to a
hypothetical case involving a disagreement with colleagues about ambiguous labora-
tory results of prenatal diagnosis, 97 percent said they would disclose the disagree-
ment. Such a finding suggests thatgeneticists might impose upon themselves the duty
to inform about the availability of the cystic fibrosis tests long before the courts
impose it upon them.
Genetic Services in Non-Reproductive Settings
The legal cases regarding negligence in genetic counseling and testing have
generally involved negligence with respect to genetic services in connection with
people's reproductive decisions. Genetic testing can, however, be used to identify
genetic defects that indicate, not a risk for the patient's offspring, but a risk for the
patient himself or herself [10]. The test may show that the patient will suffer from a
late-onset disorder [11] or that the patient is at riskofdeveloping a particular disease
when exposed to environmental stimuli [12]. Failure to advise of the existence of
such tests ornegligence in performing them could lead to malpractice actions against
health care professionals. In addition, there is a potential formalpractice liability for
not informing the patient about lifestyle changes that could lessen the chances of a
genetic disorder expressing itself.
New channels of genetic research promise to uncover more genetic defects that
result in diseases only when combined with a certain environmental stimulus.
Already, some physicians are advising parents of children with a genetic propensity
toward skin cancer to move to an area with a rainy climate [13]. As this type of
research progresses, health care providers may be liable for not warning patients
about those aspects of the environment (diet, job, climate) that could trigger a
disease.
This duty will touch more health care professionals as genetic research expands
from an emphasis on birth defects to an emphasis on chronic disease. Research on
identifying genetic propensities to coronary artery disease or diabetes, for example,
will make genetic concerns relevant to every area ofmedical practice.
Analyses of medical school curricula show that the teaching of genetics is not
emphasized. Practicing physicians have an inadequate grasp of genetics [14]. The
existence of a duty to disclose the genetic basis of disease may require changes in
medical education to assure that physicians in all areas of practice have a greater
awareness ofgenetics.
Duty toRe-Contact Patients
As new scientific information linking certain gene types to particular diseases is
uncovered, the health care provider may have a responsibility for re-contacting
patients and former patients who may now be known to be at risk (conceptually, a
"genetic recall") orwho would benefit from new tests or treatment possibilities. The
current rapid evolution of genetic diagnostic testing, and the possible relation of
established tests to new tests, makes it likely that the existing information a physician
has about apatient will subsequently take on new meaning. For example, a physician
may use a diagnostic test on a patient to learn the level of a certain gene product,
such as an enzyme. At the time the test is employed, the physician may be aware that
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a high level of the product indicates carrier status for a serious autosomal recessive
disorder. Thephysician mayprovide the testforhundredsofpatients, dulynotingthe
results in the record, and informing those patients with a high level that they are
carriers and that, ifthey mate with another carrier, they have a 25 percent chance of
giving birth to an affected child.
By following such a protocol, the physician will have admirably discharged his or
her current responsibility. But what happens when later (a month, a year, a decade),
it is learned that a low level ofthe gene product signals carrier status for a different,
although equally fatal, disorder? The physician now has information in the files
about other individuals who might give birth to a child with a fatal disorder. Does he
or she have a duty to contact those individuals and disclose that fact? Existing case
law precedents about such things as the Dalkon Shield [15] and diethylstilbestrol
(DES) [16] held that the physicians had a duty to re-contact patients to disclose
previouslyunknown risks of a treatment [17]. These precedents couldbe extended to
find aduty to disclose this situation aswell.
Similar situations may arise with respect to other types of genetic diagnostic
techniques. Certain tests have been used to determine if a person was a carrier of a
particular autosomal recessive disorder. The traditional learning was that a carrier
was not herself at health risk, but that, if she mated with another carrier, she might
give birth to an affected child. In recent years, however, research has indicated that
carriers of single gene recessive disorders might have a predisposition toward
developing other types of health problems. For example, carriers ofhomocystinuria
apparently are at higher-than-average risk for developing cardiovascular disease.
Again, physicians and genetic counselors might thus be responsible for re-contacting
patients and former patients who had been identified as carriers in order to advise
them ofthisnewly discovered health risk.
Yet anotherproblem situation existswhen an infant is diagnosed and treated for a
geneticdisorder, but subsequentlyreachesreproductive agewithout realizing that he
or she has been affected by a genetic disease. In the 1960s, state public health
departments began screening infants for metabolic disorders, such as the autosomal
recessive disorder, phenylketonuria (PKU) [18]. Upon discovering positive test
results, the state notified the affected children's doctors so that treatment could
begin on the affected children. The PKU children were put on a special diet to
prevent mental retardation, but many stopped the diet before age seven. As female
children enter their childbearing years, they may not remember that they had been
diagnosed as having PKU or that they had been fed the special diet. Some are
beginning to have children of their own, without realizing that there is a high
likelihood thattheywillgive birth to amentallyretarded child iftheydo notgo on the
diet during pregnancy [19]. Efforts are already under way to re-contact PKU girls
whenthey reach age 13 to advisethem ofthe effect ofthe diseasebefore theybecome
pregnant.
Each of these scenarios raises questions ofthe duties ofhealth care professionals
to patients and former patients. Ifthe individual is still a patient ofthe professional,
it is reasonable to expect the professional to disclose the new (or the now relevant)
information. That responsibility seems more attenuated when the individual is no
longer a patient. The practitioner might claim that there should be no duty to
re-contact a former patient in these situations since physicians do not have a duty to
re-contactpatientswith other types ofdisorderswhen new information is available to
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aid their condition. For example, physicians are not thought to have a responsibility
to contact a former cardiac patient when a new diagnostic test or treatment
technology becomes available; however, the genetic scenarios are distinguishable.
The issue is not whether the physician has a duty to advise a patient of a potential
new service. Rather, the issue is whether the practitioner has a duty to advise the
patient of the new implications of a previously rendered service (i.e., the diagnostic
test which has new significance). There are no direct legal precedents for this
situation; courts are likely to apply the logic of cases creating duties to disclose
subsequently discovered risks of treatment.
CONFIDENTIALITY
The second major issue concerns confidentiality and the type of control people
should have over their genetic information. Medical records containing genetic
information are particularly volatile. Unlike an infectious disease, a genetic disorder
is generally immutable. Thus, an inappropriate disclosure may haunt the individual
throughout his or her life. The revelation of genetic information can cause serious
financial, emotional, and perhaps even physical harm to the patient. An employer
might decide to fire an employee based on the evidence that the employee, later in
life, would suffer from a late-onset disorder. An insurance companymight decide not
to provide coverage ofthat person, based on the same information.
Courts now recognize causes of action against health care providers and health
care institutions for breaches of confidentiality on several grounds: breach of
contract [20], violation of privacy [20,21], malpractice [22], and breach of fiduciary
duty [20,22]. They could also recognize a cause of action based on interference with
contractual relations or infliction ofemotional distress. Indeed, as one courtpointed
out, "[t]he promise of secrecy is as much an express warranty [on the part of the
health care provider] as the advertisement of a commercial entrepreneur" [23].
A physician may in certain instances breach confidentiality in order to protect
third parties from harm. For health careprofessionals, thispossibility came upvividly
in the early part of the century as a duty to warn members of a patient'sfamily when
the patient was suffering from an infectious disease [24,25,26], such as smallpox or
typhoid. Subsequently, psychiatrists were found be have a duty to warn intended
victims oftheirpotentiallyviolent patients [27].
How would the law address the issue ofdisclosure ofgenetic information? Aswith
the cystic fibrosis example, part of the answer to that question will depend on the
standards geneticists and other health care providers set for themselves. In a survey
of 295 geneticists in the United States, Dorothy Wertz and John Fletcher found that
most would not breach confidentiality and report to employers or insurers without
the patient's permission. Only 12 percent of the geneticists said that they would
provide the information to insurers without consent and 24 percent would disclose
information to employerswithout consent [9].
This attitude is in marked contrast to the geneticists' feelings about disclosure to
relatives. Wertz and Fletcher questioned the geneticists about whether they would
contact relatives against the wishes of a patient who had a defective gene for
Huntington's disease or hemophilia A. They expected that more would breach
confidentiality and warn relatives who were at risk for hemophilia A, since it is
treatable, while Huntington's disease is not. They found, however, that 54 percent
would breach confidentiality with respect to hemophilia A and that 53 percent-
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almost the same number-would breach confidentiality with respect to Huntington's
disease [9]. Thus, over halfthe geneticists who responded to the Wertz and Fletcher
survey seem to sense that their relationships with their counselees and patients give
rise to a duty to warn relatives.
Disclosure to Relatives
Inconsidering whether a health care provider should contact a blood relative over
thepatient's refusal, however, various factors should be weighed that do not seem to
have figured in the responses to the survey, such as the likelihood that the relative
has thegenetic defect, the seriousness of the defect to the health of the relative and
his or her children, and the likelihood that the relative's defect would be otherwise
detected. The President's Commission fortheStudyofEthical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research recommended that disclosure should be
made only if reasonable attempts to elicit voluntary disclosure are unsuccessful,
there is a highprobability of serious (for example, irreversible or fatal) harm to an
identifiable thirdparty, there is reason to believe that disclosure of the information
will prevent harm, and the disclosure is limited to the information necessary for
diagnosis or treatment ofthe thirdparty[28]. Ifagenetic disorder is not serious, if it
islikelythat the relative's disorderwillbe diagnosed even ifno disclosure is made, if
earlydisclosurewould notmarkedlychange theprognosis (for example, ifthere were
no known treatments), or if the possibility of the disorder is of relatively common
knowledge (such as sickle-cell anemia among blacks or Tay-Sachs disease among
AshkenazieJews), the needfordisclosure ismuted. The strongest case for disclosure
ofgenetic information exists when the disclosure would prevent serious imminent
harm to a third party.
No courts have held that there is aduty to warn relatives ofpatients that they, too,
may be at risk ofgenetic disorders. Some health care professionals, however, would
like to take on that responsibility.
Health careprofessionals in favor ofcontacting relatives who are at risk should be
aware of the public policy implications of their actions. Even when an individual
instancepresentsaparticularlycompellingcase fordisclosure, health care profession-
als should analyze the systemic effects ofundertaking disclosure. Since the duty to
disclose to relatives will be measured in part by the standard of care in the medical
genetics community, exercising a right to disclose may ultimately set a standard
creating a duty to disclose. The ramifications of such a duty could be awesome.
Considertheburdensoftrackingdown allthe close relatives in an instance ofgenetic
disease. Moreover, since research is increasingly revealing that many common
disorders have agenetic basis, physicians in general practice or in specialties other
thangeneticsmight also be held to have aduty to inform relatives. For example, if a
youngman hascoronaryarterydisease, theremightbe adutytowarn his siblings that
they, too, may be at risk. And consider the burdens on the state public health
departmentif,everytime it found an infantwho tested positive for phenylketonuria,
it had a duty to contact the infant's aunts and uncles to tell them that their own
children may similarly be at risk.
Ifpractitionersbegin to disclose such information to relatives, they may establish a
standard of care within the profession whereby relatives who have not been con-
tacted will sue them. Considering, in one clinician's estimate, that there are an
average of three at-risk family members for each patient, and that family members
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may be scattered around the country, the burdens of identifying and tracking down
relatives maybe great.
As a legal policy, it would seem less appropriate to require health care practitio-
ners to disclose a patient's genetic defect to a relative than to disclose a patient's
infectious disease or violent tendencies. In the latter case, the patient could
potentially harm the relative. In the former case, that of genetic defect, the patient
will not cause harm to the relative. The only potential argument that the health care
professional could make for contacting the relative, is that, through diagnosis of the
patient, the health care professional has reason to believe that the relative is at
higher risk than the general population ofbeing affected by a genetic disorder. The
practitioner has, however, similar knowledge about avariety ofthird parties (such as
the risk that pregnant women over 40 will give birth to a child with a chromosomal
defect).
If the practitioner has a duty to tell a relative with whom he or she is not in a
professional relationship about the enhanced risk to that relative, itwould seem that
a practitioner should also have an obligation to tell any other stranger about an
enhanced riskthat stranger faces. Such adutywould seem tobe excessive, and thus it
might be an appropriate policy to limit practitioners' disclosure duties to the patient
alone (unless the patient will actually cause harm). Even if disclosure to relatives
wereundertaken, itwouldbe oflimitedvalue and could not replace othermethodsof
screening for or diagnosing genetic disorders. In one study ofTay-Sachs disease, the
majority (82 percent) of the incidents of the disease were initial occurrences within
the kindred [29].
The patient does have an ethical duty to inform relatives, however, and health care
professionals should give patients help in fulfilling that duty. Genetics workers
should clearly tell patientswhat informationwill bevaluable to relatives. Itmight aid
patients in contacting relatives if the clinic provided materials that could be sent to
relatives. Written materials not only help the patient better understand his or her
disorder or defect; they also can be duplicated and sent to relatives.
Disclosure to LawEnforcement Officials
An attempt to breach confidentiality might also be undertaken for law enforce-
ment purposes [30]. Police maywish to obtain a blood sample from a person to see if
the DNAmatches that ofblood, semen, hair, or other tissues left at a crime site. The
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects people from unreasonable
searches and seizures; itwould not permit thewholesale blood samplingdescribed in
Joseph Wambaugh's The Blooding. Instead, in the United States, the police would
have to showprobable cause that a particular individual was linked to a crime before
taking a sample ofhis or her blood [31].
What about the situation inwhich manypeople have banked their DNA in a clinic
as part oftheir own medical care or for family linkage studies, and law enforcement
officials want access to everyone's DNAinorder to try toidentifythe perpetratorofa
crime? If the physical invasion of the blood sampling is the main focus of the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, then law enforcement offi-
cials could argue that they have a right to test without probable cause DNA that has
already been banked, since there will be no additional physical invasion to the
accused or tohis orherproperty. It canbe argued, however, that it is not the invasion
of the accused's body or of property, but the invasion of his expectation of privacy
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that is central to the accused's rights. Along those lines, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that the fourth amendment protects people in situations in which they have a
reasonable expectation of privacy [32]. In that case, use of an electronic recording
device on a telephone booth was held to constitute a search and seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, even though it had notphysically penetrated the
booth, and even though the booth was not the accused person's property. With
respect to genetic information, there is similarly an expectation of privacy when a
patient seeks health care. The patient does not expect thephysician to disclose his or
her findings.
Currently, law enforcement officials do compare fingerprints found at the scene of
the crime to existing fingerprint data bases. The policy implications in the use of
fingerprints are, however, radically different from those inherent in the use ofDNA.
Fingerprints are not collected in the course ofhealth care. Allowinglaw enforcement
officials to use DNA from clinical settings might discourage some people from
seeking health care in the first place-a possibility that does not existwith respect to
fingerprints. In addition, DNA reveals information that fingerprints do not-
information about physical or mental disorders that the individual does orwill suffer
from. Such information-not necessary to law enforcement purposes-can cause
harm to the individual if it is disclosed.
There may be limits to an argument based on the expectation ofprivacy, however.
Statutesviolating that expectation ofconfidentiality have been passed-forexample,
to require physicians to report gunshot wounds. Similar statutes might be passed to
allow law enforcement officials access to banked DNA in situations in which there is
probable cause. If such access-or similar access to information, rather than to the
samples themselves-is a possibility, people should be informed about that possibil-
ity before they give their consent to provide DNA to the bank in the first place.
MANDATORY TESTING
The third issue raised as we move into the new genetics iswhether a person should
be required to learn about his or her genotype. Along those lines, Margery Shaw has
already advocated mandatory genetic screening ofpotential parents and mandatory
prenatal screening [33]. Another potential governmental role is in mandatory
screening of children, which is already in effect in those states which require that
infants be tested for certain metabolic disorders [34].
Case law establishes that a competent adult generally has a right to refuse medical
care except in limited circumstances-primarily when the person has or is likely to
develop a contagious disease that would directly harm others. Even with respect to
situations in which the state has been recognized to have the power to mandate
treatment, the state has been incredibly circumspect in using that power. Vaccina-
tions have been required [35], but the government generally has not undertaken
activities to track down people who might have infections and to keep them from
participating in social life or force them tobe treated. In the current AIDS epidemic,
people have generally not been required to be tested against theirwill.
Although people may put themselves at risk in decisions regarding medical
services, the state has been allowed to intervene when the person had a contagious
disease that put others at risk due to the possibility of contagion. Some commenta-
tors argue that mandatory screening of adults for genetic disorders is justifiable
under contagious disease precedents, to prevent people from "transmitting" disease
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to their offspring. Margery Shaw, a physician and attorney, even goes so far as to
recommend mandatory abortion to prevent the birth of affected children [33]. Under
the analogy of genetic disease to infectious disease, the government could order
interventions on all individuals of reproductive age (since all people carry genetic
defects).
Yet such an approach interferes with couples' constitutional rights of privacy to
make reproductive decisions. In April 1990, a federal judge explicitly held that the
right to privacy specifically covers decisions concerning prenatal genetic testing [36].
Consequently, if a law infringes upon couples' reproductive decision-making rights
with respect to the use of genetic services, the law will be upheld as constitutional
only if it is necessary to further a compelling state interest in the least restrictive
manner possible.
With respect to other fundamental rights, such as freedoms of speech, the
government has only been allowed to interfere to protect against a danger that is
substantial, imminent, and irreparable [5]. Arguably, that is the sort of danger that
the U.S. Supreme Court envisioned when it upheld an emergency mandatory
vaccination law [37] at a time when infectious disease presented a substantial threat
to the community.
Certain infectious diseases potentially put the society as a whole at immediate risk
since the diseases can be transmitted to a large number ofpeople in a short time. The
potentialvictims are existing human beings who may be total strangers to the affected
individual. In contrast to infectious disease, the transmission ofgenetic diseases does
not present an immediate threat to society. While infectious disease can cause rapid
devastation to a community, the transmission of genetic disease to offspring does not
have an immediate detrimental effect, but rather creates a potential risk for a future
generation in society. U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with fundamental rights
have held that harm in the future is not as compelling a state interest as immediate
harm [5].
Additionally, the policy concerns raised by attempts to stop the transmission of
genetic diseases differ from those addressed to infectious diseases because genetic
diseases differentially affect people of different races. Some commentators contest
the applicability of the infectious disease model to government actions regarding
genetic disorders because "[u]nlike infectious disease which knows no ethnic, racial,
or gender boundaries, genetic disease is the result of heredity" leaving open the
possibility for discriminatory governmental actions [38].
Most reasonable people would be horrified at the thought of forcing people to be
sterilized or to undergo abortions against their will for eugenic reasons. Upon first
consideration, however, they may not be as troubled by mandatory screening for
genetic disorders in the absence of forced sterilization or abortion. Some may even
argue that mandatory screening is not an infringement on procreative rights because
it represents at most a modest physical invasion (for example, a blood test), and it
merely provides information which the person can use in making decisions about
reproduction.
The provision of information is not a value-free act, however. People have a right
to waive information-for example, they can decide to waive the presentation of
health care information before they consent to treatment [39]. In addition, the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that the presentation of information in the context of
reproductive decisions can coerce an individual to make a particular decision. Laws
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that required that women be given information that tended to pressure them not to
have an abortion havebeen struckdown asunconstitutional. In CityofAkron v.Akron
Centerfor Reproductive Health, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
statutory provisions that required physicians to give speculative information such as
the characteristics of the fetus, including ability to feel pain, and provisions that
required physicians to present "a 'parade of horribles' intended to suggest that
abortion is a particularly dangerous procedure" [40].
In a 1986 case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the required disclosure even of
information that was medically accurate and objective could be unconstitutional
because it tended to influence a person's reproductive decision [41]. The Court said
that "[t]he States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or
potential life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies." The Court recog-
nized that certain information-no matterhowobjective and accurate-is not always
relevant to a person's reproductive decision, and "it may only serve to confuse and
punish her and to heighten her anxiety," which is contrary to proper medical care
sensitive to the individual patient's needs.
Moreover, in order to reach potential parents, screening of adolescents in school,
people of reproductive age generally, or people applying for marriage licenses has
been suggested; however, such screening measures carry psychological and social
risks. In a Montreal Tay-Sachs screening program, several thousand people under
age 18 were screened. The adolescents screened experienced anxiety when they
learned theywere carriers [42]. In anotherstudy, an American adolescent reportedly
suffered a psychotic reactionwhen she was told she was a carrier ofTay-Sachs [43].
Screening of adults, too, can lead to psychological trauma. Some people have
committed suicide when they learned they were carriers ofHuntington's disease. In
fact, deaths due to suicide are four times as prevalent among Huntington's disease
patients than among the corresponding U.S. Caucasian population [44].
In addition to presenting a psychological risk to those individuals who learn that
they are carriers of genetic disorders, screening can present a psychological risk to
those who find they are not carrying the defective gene. According to NancyWexler,
when at-risk individuals learn that they are not carriers of Huntington's disease,
"[m]any may suffer 'survivor guilt,' particularly characteristic of wartime soldiers
who live while their buddies are killed" [45].
To a limited extent, government screening of adult carriers has already begun. In
Illinois, for example, the mandatory premarital medical examination is required to
include sickle-cell screening ifthe examining physician determines it to be necessary
[46]. An Alaska law requires that before a marriage license is issued, a physician
certify that "the applicant has been tested, as prescribed in the regulations of the
department, for the presence ofinfectious or heritable disease . . . " [47].
It is ironic that compulsory premarital genetic screening is being advocated at a
time when compulsory venereal disease screening is being repealed. For example,
New York abolished its requirements for premarital gonorrhea and syphilis testing.
One of the reasons for the abolition ofthe requirements was that they were not the
most appropriate way to reach the population at risk. The New York City Depart-
ment of Health found that, in 1983, marriage applicants spent approximately
$15,988,800 on premarital screening, yet this testing detected only 32 early syphilis
cases. Thus, the estimated cost per case detected was $499,500 [5].
A National Academy of Sciences Committee has taken the position that genetic
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screening should be voluntary [48]. This stand comports with the individual's right of
self-determination. An individual may not wish to know his carrier status. Indeed, a
third ofthe people at risk from Huntington's disease said theywould not want to be
tested [45]. Mandatory screening has also been criticized because it could lead to
stigmatization of carriers. For example, discrimination against people at risk for
Huntington's disease has already occurred [45]. If a definitive test were made
compulsory, it might be used by employers or insurers to disadvantage asymptomatic
carriers. Even with respect to disorders inwhich carrier status leads to little or no ill
effects on health (such as sickle-cell anemia), discrimination has resulted in the past
[5].
CONCLUSION
As a specialty within medicine, the new genetics raises certain legal issues
regarding research, diagnosis, and treatment that are common to other health care
endeavors. But the application ofexisting medicolegal principles to medical genetics
does not always result in an adequate fit, formedical genetics is unique in some ofthe
challenges it raises for individuals and for society.
Many of the legal questions raised by genetics can be handled by turning to
precedentscoveringother types ofmedical practice. Nevertheless, the social, psycho-
logical, and ethical effect of medical genetics extends far beyond that ofother areas
ofmedicine. AsAlexanderCapron points out, "a technology that might peer into our
genes and even transform them cuts to a deeper level of psychological significance
than do others inbiomedicine, however technically spectacular they maybe" [49].
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